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RAILROAD COMPANY V. HARRIS, 79 U. S. 65 (1870)
U.S. Supreme Court
Railroad Company v. Harris, 79 U.S. 12 Wall. 65 65 (1870)
Railroad Company v. Harris
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
1. Where a Maryland railroad corporation whose charter contemplated the extension of the road beyond the limits of Maryland was allowed by act of the Legislature of Virginia -- reenacting the Maryland charter in words -- to continue its road through that State and was also allowed by act of Congress to extend into the District of Columbia, a lateral road in connection with the road through Maryland and Virginia, held (the unity of the road being unchanged in name, locality, election and power of officers, mode of declaring dividends, and doing all its business)
First. That no new corporations were created either in the District or in Virginia, but only that the old one was exercising its faculties in them with their permission, and that, as related to responsibility for damages, there was a unity of ownership throughout.
Second. That in view of such unity, the corporation was amenable to the courts of the District for injuries done in Virginia on its road.
Third. That this responsibility was not changed by a traveler's receiving tickets in "coupons" or different parts, announcing that "Responsibility for safety of person or loss of baggage on each portion of the route is confined to the proprietors of that portion alone."
2. The principle of pleading that a demurrer, after several pleadings, reaches back to a defective declaration has no application where the defect is one of form simply.
3. A plea in bar waives all pleas in abatement.
4. A defective declaration may be cured by sufficient averments in a replication demurred to.
On the 28th February, 1827, the State of Maryland incorporated a company known as the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. It was, of course, a Maryland corporation, with capacity to sue and be sued, to take and condemn lands, subject to certain restrictions, and with the ordinary powers, rights, and privileges of corporations in that State and elsewhere. The place where the board of directors was to meet was Baltimore. There its dividends from the company's earnings were to be declared, and there was to be the seat of its government generally. It had power to make lateral roads. But the principal and declared purpose of the charter of the company, a purpose indicated by the company's name, was "the construction of a railroad from the City of Baltimore to some suitable point on the Ohio River" -- a matter to do which, in a line at all direct, it was necessary to have some action of the Legislature of Virginia. Accordingly the Legislature of Virginia, within eight days after the Legislature of Maryland had passed its act of incorporation, passed an act to "confirm" the same. The Virginia act reads thus:
"Whereas, an act has passed the Legislature of Maryland, entitled 'An act to incorporate the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, in the following words and figures,' viz.: (setting out the Maryland acts). Therefore be it enacted by the General Assembly that the same rights and privileges shall be and are hereby granted to the aforesaid company, within the territory of Virginia as are granted to them within the territory of Maryland. The said company shall be subject to the same pains, penalties, and obligations as are imposed by said act, and the same rights, privileges, and immunities which are reserved to the State of Maryland or to the citizens thereof are hereby reserved to the State of Virginia and her citizens, except as to making lateral roads, and that the road shall not strike the
Ohio at a point below the mouth of the Little Kanawha; that the words 'other property' in the 17th section of the Maryland act shall not be construed to extend to any property other than materials necessary for the road, works, and buildings, and that in procuring land and materials for the road, they shall pursue the course pointed out by the Virginia laws."
Under these acts, a railroad was accordingly made between Baltimore and the Ohio River.
Subsequently to this date -- that is to say, on the 22d February, 1831, the Legislature of Maryland gave the company authority to build a lateral road from the main road between Baltimore to the Ohio, to the line of the District of Columbia. In immediate sequence, Congress passed a law by which a connection with the Capital was opened through the District. The act of Congress, which was approved March 2, 1831, entitled "An act to authorize the extension, construction, and use of a lateral branch of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, into and within the District of Columbia," ran thus:
"Whereas it is represented to this present Congress that the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, incorporated by the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, by an act passed the 28th day of February, 1827, are desirous under the powers which they claim to be vested in them by virtue of the provisions of the before-mentioned act, to construct a lateral branch from the said Baltimore & Ohio Railroad to the District of Columbia, therefore,"
"Be it enacted &c. that the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, incorporated by the said act of the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, shall be, and they are hereby authorized to extend into and within the District of Columbia, a lateral railroad such as the said company shall construct or cause to be constructed in a direction towards the said District in connection with the road they have located and are constructing from the City of Baltimore to the Ohio River in pursuance of said act of incorporation. And the said Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company are hereby authorized to exercise the same powers, rights, and privileges, and shall be subject to the same restrictions in the construction and extension of the said lateral
road into and within the said District as they may exercise or be subject to under or by virtue of the said act of incorporation in the extension and construction of any railroad within the State of Maryland, and shall be entitled to the same rights, benefits, and immunities in the use of said road and in regard thereto as are provided in the said charter, except the right to construct any lateral road or roads in said District from said lateral road."
A supplementary act of the Legislature of Maryland, passed March 14, 1832, provided that the stock issued by the company to complete this lateral road "shall, united, form the capital upon which the net profits derived from the use of said road shall be apportioned."
Under this act of Congress and the act of Maryland authorizing a lateral road, a road was made from Washington to a point on the main road called the Washington Junction, not far from Baltimore, and so a complete road by rail opened from Washington to the Ohio River. At this point, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad terminated. From Belair, in Ohio, opposite this point of termination, began another road (the Ohio Central), running to Columbus. While, however, the road from Washington to the Ohio River was thus made up of two parts, one from Washington to the Junction and one from the Junction to the Ohio River, each part, as the reader will have observed, was made in virtue of two different enactments -- the former, from Washington to the Junction, by the act of Congress and the act of Maryland; the latter, or main branch, by the act of Maryland and the act of Virginia.
In this state of things, one Harris bought, at an office which the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company had established in Washington, a ticket with which to go to Columbus, Ohio. This ticket was made up of three coupons, one for travel between Washington City and the Washington Junction; another for travel between Washington Junction and the Ohio River, over the line of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad; and the third and last, for travel from Belair, in Ohio, opposite the terminus of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, to Columbus, in Ohio, over the line of the Central
Ohio Railroad, already mentioned as confessedly disconnected with the Baltimore & Ohio one except in the matter of running junction. [Footnote 1]
Over the first coupon was a memorandum thus:
"Responsibility for safety of person or loss of baggage on each portion of the route is confined to the proprietors of that portion alone."
And each coupon had printed on it:
"CONDITIONED AS ABOVE."
While traveling on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, at Mannington, in the State of Virginia, Harris was severely injured by a collision between the train in which he was so traveling and another train of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. He accordingly brought suit against the railroad in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for the injury he had suffered. The writ was served on the president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. At the time that the writ was thus served, there was no act of Congress authorizing suits against foreign corporations doing business in the District. Some time afterwards -- that is to say, on the 22d of February, 1867, [Footnote 2] Congress enacted:
"That in actions against foreign corporations doing business in the District of Columbia, all process may be served on the agent of such corporation or person conducting its business aforesaid, or in case he is absent and cannot be found, by leaving a copy thereof at the principal place of business of, in the District, and such service shall be effectual to bring the corporation before the court."
The declaration was against the company, describing it not as a citizen, or resident, or inhabitant of the District, or of
any State, but as
"a corporation duly and legally established by law, having and professing a legal and recognized existence, within the limits of the District of Columbia, and exercising therein corporate powers, rights, and privileges, in the making of the contracts, receiving freight and passengers, for transportation in and along their said railroad, from the City of Washington to the Ohio River,"
and it relied on the purchase of the ticket, and a contract in virtue thereof, to carry the plaintiff safely to the Ohio River, and the breach of the contract in what had occurred.
The company pleaded in abatement,
1st. That the company was not an inhabitant of the District of Columbia when the writ was served.
2d. That the company was not found in the District of Columbia when the writ was served.
The view of the company in their pleas apparently was that no new corporation had been created by the act of Congress of 1831 within the District, and so made an inhabitant of it; that the old corporation, by virtue of that act, did not become such an inhabitant or found within the District, and that the court in which the action was brought had succeeded but to the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the District; a court in regard to whose jurisdiction it was provided by the 6th section of an Act of February 27, 1801, [Footnote 3] identical, so far as this suit was concerned, with the 11th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789:
"That no action or suit shall be brought before said court by any original process against any person who shall not be an inhabitant of or found within said District at the time of serving the writ."
To the first of the above-mentioned pleas Harris replied that the company was an inhabitant of the District of Columbia by virtue of the act of Congress already mentioned, the date and title of which he set forth, and that they had accepted its provisions, and constructed their roads under the
act, availing themselves of the privileges thus conferred and doing business under it in the District of Columbia.
To the second, that the company was found within the District of Columbia when the writ was served and was within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of the acts of Congress mentioned in the first replication, and that due and legal service of the writ was made upon the person of the president within the District, &c.
The company demurred to these replications, adding to the demurrer an admission of the service on the president but denying that such service was a legal service or service on the company. The demurrers were overruled. The company thereupon filed the general issue of Not Guilty. Upon the trial, the counsel of the company asked the court to instruct the jury that upon the evidence before them, the plaintiff could not recover.
The court refused to give the instruction, and the jury having found $8,250 damages for the plaintiff, the company brought the case here.
It was argued at the last term, when a reargument was directed upon one of the points raised in the first argument, to-wit:
"Whether the acts of Congress and the statutes of West Virginia relating to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company created a new and distinct corporation under that name in the said state and District of Columbia, respectively, or whether they are only enabling acts, as respected the corporation under that name, created by the State of Maryland. "
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
Harris sued the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company for injuries which he received by a collision. The declaration sets out that the company is a corporation established by law by the name of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, having a legal and recognized existence within the limits of the District of Columbia and exercising there their corporate rights and privileges in the making of contracts and receiving freight and passengers for transportation upon their roads from the City of Washington to the Ohio River; that at the City of Washington, on the 23d of October, 1864, the plaintiff, wishing to be transported by the company over their roads to the Ohio River and towards the city of Columbus in the State of Ohio, for the sum of fifteen
dollars paid to the company, purchased of them a ticket for a seat and passage in their cars, to be transported along their roads from the City of Washington to the Ohio River and towards the City of Columbus; that in pursuance of this contract, he took his seat in one of the cars of the company; that the company, in consideration of the money so paid, undertook and promised to transport him safely to the Ohio River; that the company managed their trains so negligently and carelessly that two trains, running in opposite directions, came in collision near Mannington, in the State of Virginia, whereby the plaintiff received the injuries complained of.
The company pleaded two pleas in abatement.
(1) That the company was not an inhabitant of the District of Columbia when the writ was served. (2) That the company was not found in the District of Columbia when the writ was served.
To the first plea Harris replied that the company was an inhabitant of the District of Columbia by virtue of certain acts of Congress, the dates and titles of which are set forth, and that they had accepted the provisions of those acts and constructed their roads under them, availing themselves of the privileges thus conferred and doing business under them in the District of Columbia. To the second plea he replied that the company was found within the District of Columbia when the writ was served, and was within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of the acts of Congress mentioned in the first replication.
The company demurred to these replications. The demurrers were overruled. The company thereupon filed the general issue of not guilty. The cause was tried by a jury and a verdict found for the plaintiff, upon which judgment was entered.
Upon the trial, the counsel for the company prayed the court to instruct the jury that upon the evidence before them, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The court refused to give this instruction, and the company excepted. Other exceptions appear by the record to have been taken, but they were not embodied in a bill of exceptions and we cannot
therefore consider them. The errors insisted upon here, at the first argument of the case, were:
The overruling of the demurrers to the replications to the pleas in abatement.
The refusal of the court to give the instruction above set forth.
And that the declaration is fatally defective, wherefore the judgment should have been arrested and must now be reversed.
When the case was first considered by this Court in conference, it was found that while all the judges were of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed, there was a difference of opinion upon the question whether the acts of Congress and the statutes of Virginia relating to the company created a new and distinct corporation in the District of Columbia and in the State of Virginia, respectively, or whether they were only enabling acts in respect to the corporation under the name of the "Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company," as originally created by the State of Maryland. Subsequently the question was ordered to stand for reargument, and it has been reargued by the counsel on both sides. As the solution of this question must determine, to a large extent, the grounds upon which the judgment of the court is to be placed, it is necessary carefully to consider the subject.
The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company was incorporated by an Act of the Legislature of Maryland passed on the 28th of February, 1827. On the 8th of March following, the Legislature of Virginia passed an act whereby, after reciting the Maryland act, it was declared
"that the same rights and privileges shall be, and are hereby, granted to the aforesaid company within the territory of Virginia, and the said company shall be subject to the same pains, penalties, and obligations as are imposed by said act, and the same rights, privileges, and immunities which are reserved to the State of Maryland or to the citizens thereof are hereby reserved to the State of Virginia and her citizens."
Several other statutes relating to the company were subsequently passed in Virginia, but they do not materially
affect the question under consideration, and need not be more particularly adverted to. By an Act of the Legislature of Maryland of the 22d of February, 1831, the company was authorized to build a lateral road to the line of the District of Columbia. On the 2d of March, 1831, Congress passed an act which, after reciting by a preamble the original act of incorporation, enacted
"That the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, incorporated by the said act of the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, shall be, and they are hereby, authorized to extend into and within the District of Columbia a lateral railroad. . . . And the said Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company are hereby authorized to exercise the same powers, rights, and privileges, and shall be subject to the same restrictions in the construction and extension of the said lateral road into and within the said District as they may exercise or be subject to under or by virtue of the said act of incorporation in the extension and construction of any railroad within the State of Maryland, and shall be entitled to the same rights, benefits, and immunities in the use of said road and in regard thereto as are provided in the said charter, except the right to construct any lateral road or roads in said District from said lateral road."
A number of local regulations follow which are not material to be considered. A supplementary Act of the Legislature of Maryland, passed March 14th, 1832, provided that the stock issued by the company to complete this lateral road "shall, united, form the capital upon which the net profits derived from the use of said road shall be apportioned," &c.
The Act of Congress of February 26, 1834, and of March 3, 1835, are confined to matters of detail, and may be laid out of view.
When the case was reargued as directed by this Court, the counsel for the company admitted that the acts of Congress in question were only enabling acts, and that they did not create a new corporation, but they insisted that the acts of Virginia were of a different character, and that they worked that result.
As regards the point under consideration, we find no substantial difference. In both, the original Maryland act of incorporation is referred to, but neither expressly or by implication create a new corporation. The company was chartered to construct a road in Virginia as well as in Maryland. The latter could not be done without the consent of Virginia. That consent was given upon the terms which she thought proper to prescribe. With a few exceptions not material to the question before us, they were the same as to powers, privileges, obligations, restrictions, and liabilities as those contained in the original charter. The permission was broad and comprehensive in its scope, but it was a license, and nothing more. It was given to the Maryland corporation as such, and that body was the same in all its elements and in its identity afterwards as before. In its name, locality, capital stock, the election and power of its officers, in the mode of declaring dividends, and doing all its business, its unity was unchanged. Only the sphere of its operations was enlarged.
In what it does in Virginia, the same principle is involved as in the transactions of the Georgia corporation in Alabama, which came under the consideration of this Court in Bank of Augusta v. Earle. [Footnote 4] The distinction is that here the assent of the foreign authority is express, while there it was implied. A corporation is, in law, for civil purposes, deemed a person. It may sue and be sued, grant and receive, and do all other acts not ultra vires which a natural person could do. The chief point of difference between the natural and the artificial person is that the former may do whatever is not forbidden by law; the latter can do only what is authorized by its charter. It cannot migrate, but may exercise its authority in a foreign territory upon such conditions as may be prescribed by the law of the place. One of these conditions may be that it shall consent to be sued there. If it do business there, it will be presumed to have assented, and will be bound accordingly. [Footnote 5] For the
purposes of federal jurisdiction, it is regarded as if it were a citizen of the state where it was created, and no averment or proof as to the citizenship of its members elsewhere will be permitted. There is a presumption of law which is conclusive. [Footnote 6]
We see no reason why several states cannot, by competent legislation, unite in creating the same corporation or in combining several preexisting corporations into a single one. The Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company is one of the latter description. In the case of that company against Maryland, [Footnote 7] Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of this Court, said:
"The plaintiff in error is a corporation composed of several railroad companies, which had been previously chartered by the States of Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, and which, by corresponding laws of the respective states, were united together and form one corporation under the name and style of The Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company. The road of this corporation extends from Philadelphia to Baltimore."
He gives the history of the legislation by which this result was produced. No question was raised on the subject, but the opinion assumes the valid existence of the corporation thus created. The case was brought into this Court under the 25th section Of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The jurisdictional effect of the existence of such a corporation, as regards the federal courts, is the same as that of a copartnership of individual citizens residing in different states. Nor do we see any reason why one state may not make a corporation of another state, as there organized and conducted, a corporation of its own, quo ad hoc any property within its territorial jurisdiction. That this may be done was distinctly held in Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Wheeler. [Footnote 8] It is well settled that corporations of one state may exercise their faculties in another
so far and on such terms and to such extent as may be permitted by the latter. [Footnote 9] We hold that the case before us is within this latter category. The question is always one of legislative intent, and not of legislative power or legal possibility. So far as there is anything in the language of the Court in the case of Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Wheeler in conflict with what has been here said, it is intended to be restrained and qualified by this opinion. We will add, however, that as the case appears in the report, we think the judgment of the Court was correctly given. It was the case of an Indiana railroad company licensed by Ohio, suing a citizen of Indiana in the Federal court of that state.
In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Gallahue's Administrator, 12 Grattan, [Footnote 10] it was held by the Court of Appeals of Virginia that the company was suable in that state. In this we concur. We think this condition is clearly implied in the license, and that the company, by constructing its road there, assented to it. The authority of that case was recognized by the Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Goshorn v. The Supervisors, [Footnote 11] and in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. The Supervisors. [Footnote 12] Here the question is whether the company was suable in the District of Columbia. In the case reported in Grattan, it was said:
"It would be a startling proposition if in all such cases citizens of Virginia and others should be denied all remedy in her courts for causes of action arising under contracts and acts entered into or done within her territory, and should be turned over to the courts and laws of a sister state to seek redress."
The same considerations apply to the case before us. When this suit was commenced, if the theory maintained by the counsel for the plaintiff in error be correct, however large or small the cause of action, and whether it were a proper one for legal or equitable cognizance, there could be no legal redress short of the seat of the company in another
state. In many instances, the cost of the remedy would have largely exceeded the value of its fruits. In suits local in their character, both at law and in equity, there could be no relief. The result would be, to a large extent, immunity from all legal responsibility. It is not to be supposed that Congress intended that the important powers and privileges granted should be followed by such results.
But, turning our attention from this view of the subject and looking at the statute alone and reading it by its own light, we entertain no doubt that it made the company liable to suit where this suit was brought in all respects as if it had been an independent corporation of the same locality.
We will now consider specifically the several objections to the judgment relied upon by the plaintiffs in error. The pleas in abatement were bad. The demurrers reached back to the first error in the pleadings, and judgment was properly given against the party who committed it. If the replications were bad, bad replications were sufficient answers to bad pleas. But it is said the declaration was bad, and that the demurrers brought the defect in that pleading under review. The principle has no application where the defect is one of form, and not of substance. [Footnote 13]
The alleged defect in the declaration will be considered in connection with the error assigned relating to that subject. But if the court decided erroneously, the company waived the error by pleading over in bar. If it were desired to bring up the judgment upon the pleadings for examination by this Court, the company should have stood by the demurrers. In the proper order of pleading which is obligatory, a plea in bar waives all pleas, and the right to plead, in abatement. [Footnote 14]
The bill of exceptions which brought upon the record the refusal of the court to instruct the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover exhibits, among others, the following facts: Harris contracted, paid his money, and received his
tickets at the City of Washington. The tickets consisted of three coupons -- one for his passage from Baltimore to Columbus, Ohio, another for his passage from Washington Junction to Baltimore, and the third for his passage from Washington City to Washington Junction. It is necessary to consider only the two last mentioned. They are both headed "Baltimore & Ohio Railroad," and signed "L. M. Cole, general ticket agent." Above the coupon first mentioned is this memorandum:
"Responsibility for safely of person or loss of baggage, on each portion of the route is confined to the proprietors of that portion alone."
Each coupon has printed on its face the words "Conditioned as above." The coupon last mentioned gave Harris the right of passage over the lateral branch both in the District of Columbia and in Maryland. The second coupon gave him the same right in respect to the main stem both in Maryland and in Virginia.
The instruction asked for assumed erroneously that there were two corporations under the same name, one of them in Virginia, and that the latter was liable, and alone liable, to the plaintiff. The attempted limitation of responsibility by the memoranda at the head and on the face of the coupons proceeded upon the same erroneous assumption as to the duality of the corporate ownership of the roads.
These views are sufficiently answered by what has been already said upon the subject. But if we concurred with the counsel for the plaintiff in error, we should then hold that the agent who issued the coupons was the agent of both corporations; that the contract was a joint one; and that it involved a joint liability, unless the knowledge of the memoranda on the coupons and the assent of the plaintiff were clearly brought home to him. [Footnote 15] In all such cases, the burden of proof rests upon the carrier. [Footnote 16] The bill of exceptions does
not show that any testimony was given upon that subject. The court was asked to assume that the limitation on the face of coupons was itself conclusive, and to instruct the jury accordingly. But having held the unity of the corporation, of the proprietorship of the roads, and of the contract, it is needless further to consider the case in this aspect. The instruction asked for was properly refused.
The jurisdiction of the court was not governed by the 11th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. It did not depend upon the citizenship of the parties. It was controlled by acts of Congress local to the district. A citizen of the district cannot sue in the circuit courts of a state. [Footnote 17] If a corporation appear and defend in a foreign state, it is bound by the judgment. [Footnote 18] If the declaration were insufficient, the additional averments in the replications, admitted by the demurrer to be true, cured the defect. [Footnote 19]
The division of the ticket is described in a slightly different way in the opinion, infra, p. <|79 U.S. 85|>85. The Reporter describes it as he himself, perhaps erroneously, understood it. The matter is not important.
14 Stat. at Large 404.
2 Stat. at Large 106.
<|13 Pet. 558|>13 Pet. 558.
<|18 How. 405|>Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 405.
<|2 How. 497|>Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 ; <|16 How. 329|>Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 16 How. 329; <|1 Black 297|>Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black 297.
<|10 How. 393|>10 How. 393.
<|1 Black 297|>1 Black 297.
Blackstone Manufacturing Co. v. Inhabitants, 13 Gray, 489; <|13 Pet. 588|>Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 588.
1 W.V. 308.
3 id. 319.
<|7 Wall. 82|>Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82.
<|8 Wall. 354|>Young v. Martin, 8 Wall. 354; <|7 Wall. 82|>Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82; <|1 Wall. 42|>Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wall. 42; 1 Chitty's Pleading 440, 441.
Bissell v. Michigan S. & Northern Indiana Railroad Co., 22 N.Y. 258; Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wendell 175; Cary v. Cleveland & Toledo Railroad Co., 29 Barb. 35; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N.Y. 306; Najac v. Boston & Lowell Railroad Co., 7 Allen 329; The Great Western Railway Co. v. Blake, 7 Hurlstone & Norman 987.
<|6 How. 383|>New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 383; Brown v. Eastern Railroad Co., 11 Cushing 97; Bean v. Green, 3 Fairfield 422; Dorr v. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co., 4 Sandford 136; S.C., 1 Kernan 485.
<|2 Cranch 445|>Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445.
Angel & Ames on Corporations, §§ 404, 405; Flanders v. AEtna Ins. Co., 3 Mason 158; Cook v. Champlain Transportation Co., 1 Denio 98.
<|18 How. 405|>Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 405.
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