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AETNA LIFE INS. CO. V. LAVOIE, 475 U. S. 813 (1986)
U.S. Supreme Court
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986)
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie
Argued December 4, 1985
Decided April 22, 1986
475 U.S. 813
When appellant insurer refused to pay the full amount of a hospital bill incurred by appellees, they brought suit in an Alabama state court, seeking both payment of the full amount and punitive damages for appellant's alleged bad-faith refusal to pay a valid claim. The jury awarded $3.5 million in punitive damages. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, 5 to 4, in a per curiam opinion written by Justice Embry. Appellant then filed an application for rehearing, and, before the application was acted on, learned that, while the case was pending before the Alabama Supreme Court, Justice Embry had filed two actions in an Alabama court against insurance companies alleging bad-faith failure to pay claims and seeking punitive damages. One of the actions was a class action on behalf of all state employees insured under a group plan by Blue Cross-Blue Shield. Appellant then filed motions challenging, on due process Founds, Justice Embry's participation in the per curiam decision and his continued participation in considering the rehearing application, and also alleging that all justices on the court should recuse themselves because of their interests as potential class members in the Blue Cross suit. The court denied these motions, and also the rehearing application. Subsequently, the Blue Cross suit was settled, and Justice Embry received $30,000 under that settlement.
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the question whether Justice Embry's participation in this case violated appellant's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the Alabama Supreme Court's order denying the recusal motions clearly demonstrated that the court reached the merits of appellant's constitutional challenge, and where appellant raised this issue as soon as it discovered the facts relating to Justice Embry's personal lawsuits. Pp. 475 U. S. 819-820.
2. Appellant's allegations, on a general basis, of Justice Embry's bias and prejudice against insurance companies that were dilatory in paying claims, were insufficient to establish any constitutional violation. Pp. 475 U. S. 820-821.
3. The record, however, presents more than mere allegations of bias and prejudice, and supports the conclusion that Justice Embry's participation in this case violated appellant's due process rights. All of the issues in this case were present in his Blue Cross suit, and the very
nature of that suit placed in issue whether he would have to establish that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the underlying claims that Blue Cross refused to pay before gaining punitive damages. Moreover, the affirmance in this case of the largest punitive damages award ever issued in Alabama on precisely the type of claim raised in the Blue Cross suit "raised the stakes" for Blue Cross in that suit, to Justice Embry's benefit. Thus, his opinion for the Alabama Supreme Court had the clear and immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of his own case. When he made the judgment in this case, he acted as "a judge in his own case." His interest in this case was "direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary,'" Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57, 409 U. S. 60, as shown by the sum he received in settlement of the Blue Cross suit. Pp. 475 U. S. 821-826.
4. There is no basis for concluding that the justices of the Alabama Supreme Court other than Justice Embry were disqualified under the Due Process Clause. While those justices might conceivably have had a slight pecuniary interest in this case because of their possible inclusion in the Blue Cross class action, that interest cannot properly be characterized as "direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary." Any interest that they might have had when they passed on the rehearing application was highly speculative and contingent, since, at that time, the trial court in the Blue Cross suit had not even certified a class, let alone awarded any class relief of a pecuniary nature. Pp. 475 U. S. 826-827.
5. Because of Justice Embry's leading role in the decision under review, the "appearance of justice" will best be served by vacating the decision and remanding for further proceedings. Pp. 475 U. S. 827-828.
470 So.2d 1060, vacated and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 475 U. S. 829. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 475 U. S. 831. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
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