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BANK OF NORTH AMERICA v. PETTIT - 4 U.S. 127 (1793)
U.S. Supreme Court
BANK OF NORTH AMERICA v. PETTIT, 4 U.S. 127 (1793)
4 U.S. 127 (Dall.)
The Bank of North-America
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
April Term, 1793
CASE against the payee and indorser of a promissory note, drawn by George Henry, for 1100 dollars, payable in 45 days, and dated the 26th of March 1785. The defence was, that due notice had not been given of the drawer's non-payment of the note; and the following evidence was produced pro and con.
For the plaintiff, the runner of the bank stated, that he believed he gave the drawer notice when the note became due, as it was his custom to do; that it was also his custom, at the expiration of the three days grace, to give the indorser notice; and, he conceived, he must have called on the defendant on the evening of the last day of grace; but, if not then, he was very clear he called the next day, or the second succeeding day at farthest; that he thinks he spoke to the defendant's son, and supposes he mentioned his business; that his reason for thinking he gave notice is, that he has a memorandum of Henry's notes lying over; and the president of the bank was very particular about them, and the indorsers; that when he called at the defendant's counting-house, he gave verbal notice, that the indorsement was unpaid, and the person he saw, told him that he would inform the defendant of it; that it was not then a practice to leave written notice; and, finally, that he was not doubtful, but very clear, that he gave the notice.
For the defendant, his clerk declared that it was usual to leave notice of the protest of notes in writing; and that he did not recollect that either written, or verbal, notice was given in the present case. The defendant's son declared that he had no recollection of receiving any notice; but, on the contrary, he remembered,
that, upon making an estimate of his father's indorsements at the bank, the cashier said they amounted to 2,300 dollars; and this being denied, Henry's note was produced; which was the first intimation that the son ever had of its existence, or of its being protested.
It was argued by Tilghman and Lewis, for the plaintiff, that although the cause turned upon a mere matter of fact; and that fact being established, the decision must be governed by the principles of the mercantile law, which, generally considered, are the same throughout the mercantile world; yet, that there are special usages, arising from local circumstances, or municipal policy, that must prevail, in modifying the operation of the general law of merchants. Thus, the general law of merchants declares, that the acceptor of a bill of exchange is bound by his acceptance; but how far he is bound, varies at different places. Burrow v. Jemino, 2 Strange, 733. So, notice of the protest of a bill of exchange must be given, upon the principles of the general law; but there is a different usage, in different places, as to the strictness of the time, within which the notice must be given. The statute of Anne, introduced the negotiable character of promissory notes, and the process of declaring upon them as instruments. The practice of giving notice, in the case of promissory notes, soon followed in England, though the statute speaks nothing of the time; but, at first, a great latitude was allowed; and it is only, step by step, that the present degree of strictness on the subject, has been there established. In Pennsylvania, however, promissory notes were scarcely to be regarded as a currency before the revolution; insomuch that it is difficult to trace a suit on the records of the Courts, by the indorsee against the indorser. The act of assembly of 1715, which gave the indorsee an action against the drawer, in his own name, made no positive provision on the subject of notice; and the English practice was not adopted under the act. Punctuality, indeed, in paying such engagements was rare, and, almost, impracticable, from the state of the country. The bank of North-America began the rule of punctuality; and originated the usage of notice; and upon that usage, a period of six, seven, or eight, days has been allowed for giving the notice. What, then, is the evidence of a demand of payment from the indorser, is a reasonable time, is the only question. The runner of the bank gave notice of the protest; and this, by the common understanding of our merchants, amounts to information, that the holder of the note looks to the indorser for satisfaction. The cases cited for the plaintiff were, 2 Stra. 1175. 1245. Ld. Raym. 744. 1 Dall. 252. Robertson v. Vogle. Ibid. Bank v. M'Knight.
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